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SALE IN THE INVERSE ORDER OF ALIENATION:
A DOCTRINE BOTH FISHY AND FOUL
By ROGm D. REDDEN*
There is a doctrine in American equity jurisprudence
which bears the baffling title "sale in the inverse order of
alienation." The title is appropriate enough, as is demon-
strated by the following encyclopedist's unmanageable
single-sentence definition:
"The doctrine.., requires that where land subject
to a paramount encumbrance is subsequently sold or
encumbered in parts or parcels at different times, no
intention being disclosed in the instrument that the
purchaser or the encumbrancer of the part should pay
the whole or his proportion of the paramount encum-
brance, the parcel retained by the grantor should be
first subjected to the discharge or payment of the para-
mount encumbrance, and the parcels alienated or en-
cumbered should be reached only in the event the
parcel retained by the grantor is not sufficient to pay
that encumbrance in full, and then only to the extent
of the deficiency and in the inverse order of alienation;
and that if all of the land covered by the paramount
encumbrance has been successively alienated or en-
cumbered in parcels, the parcel last alienated or
encumbered must be first exhausted for the payment
or discharge of the paramount encumbrance, before
the parcel alienated or encumbered next preceding to
the last may be reached, and so on in that order until
the parcel first alienated or encumbered is reached, if
need there be, provided the alienee or the junior en-
cumbrancer of the part against whose parcel recourse
must be had had notice of the prior alienation or
encumbrance of another part."1
Anything as involved as that should not cheat the world
by carrying a simple name. What the writer is trying to
say, if he would only pause for breath and understand that
lawyers are human beings no more competent to deal with
the English language than high school teachers or travel
agents, is this: 0 owns Blackacre and Whiteacre, each
* Of the Caroline County Bar; A.B., Yale University, 1954, LL.B.,
University of Maryland School of Law, 1957.
135 AM. Jun. 399, Marshaling Assets and Securities, §32.
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valued at $10,000. 0 mortgages both to A as security for
a $10,000 loan. Then 0 sells Blackacre to B for $10,000,
giving B a fee simple, special warranty deed making no
mention of the existence of the mortgage. Some time later,
0 defaults and A commences foreclosure proceedings
against both properties. At this point, B may, under the
doctrine, obtain relief in the equity court by alleging the
facts of the situation and praying the sale of Whiteacre to
satisfy A's claim.
That is easy enough, and no one will complain about
the fairness of granting such relief. 0 got a full price for
Blackacre and warranted the property, thus personally
guaranteeing to B the payment of the mortgage. 0 should
not now be permitted to save Whiteacre from foreclosure.
A is an indifferent or neutral party; as long as he gets his
$10,000 back, it can't matter to him which property is sold.
So much for the first part of the doctrine.
Now, suppose that, after selling Blackacre to B, 0 sells
Whiteacre to C, also for $10,000, giving a special warranty,
fee simple deed, no mention being made of the mortgage
to A. 0 now has $30,000 from his loan, two sales and, as
any law student can observe, all the trappings of a villain.
He takes his loot and departs rather unexpectedly, the
neighbors observe, for Mexico City. A begins foreclosure.
Again the doctrine can be advanced by B to protect him-
self, requiring Whiteacre to go first in satisfaction of A's
claim, on the basis that O's intent was to saddle Whiteacre
with the primary mortgage liability even though the deeds
to the two properties were identical in their assurances and
silence about the mortgage. It is here that one recognizes
the source of the doctrine's title - the foreclosure sale
must be in reverse order of private sale, so that the last
parcel sold by the mortgagor is the first to be liquidated
for the benefit of the mortgagee.
It is with this latter portion of the doctrine, the part
from which arises its mystic title, that the author wishes
to quarrel. But, before taking up the cudgels of argument,
I should like first to study the Maryland cases on the
subject.
While other States have been plagued with many cases
the decisions of which turned on the invocation of the
doctrine,2 the Maryland reporter system contains but three
such cases, the most recent having been decided in 1900.
Whether this lack of recent appellate interest in the subject
indicates the excellence of local title searchers in keeping
2 See the excellent annotation in 131 A. L. R. 4.
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their clients out of such tangles or a general indifference
to the whole business is not for me to say.
In 1846 the Court of Appeals enjoyed its first oppor-
tunity to reject the doctrine, and did just that in the case
of Doub v. Barnes.3 Essentially, the facts were these:
Barnes, embarrassed financially and plagued by a number
of unpaid judgments, conveyed several parcels of realty to
trustees for the benefit of creditors, who were to sell the
parcels and pay the creditors out of the proceeds. Doub
was one of the earlier purchasers from the trustees and he
paid a full, fair value for the parcels he bought. In time,
some of the judgment creditors, ignoring the trustees,
levied execution on Doub's parcels. He got an injunction
against completion of the levy but this was later dissolved;
he appealed, and lost. Speaking through Chief Judge
Archer, the Court turned down Doub's request that the
property still in the hands of the trustees be first sold,
that in the hands of purchasers subsequent to him be next
sold, and his parcels be touched only if the proceeds from
these sales failed to pay off the judgments.4 It held, quite
simply, that each parcel in the hands of the trustees or
purchasers from them was liable pro rata for the judgment
liens, hence Doub's only relief was the right to demand
contribution from the other purchasers and the trustees.
This was stated to be the English rule and the Court ex-
pressly declined to follow the "departures" that had taken
place in New York.5 In a separate opinion, Judge Magruder
upbraided Doub for failure (1) to see to it that his purchase
money was applied to judgment liens on his parcels and
(2) to get releases.' He was so disturbed by what he con-
sidered Doub's thoughtlessness that he threw a stern latin
maxim down from the bench: vigilantibus non dormientibus
leges subserviunt7 which is, being freely translated, "the
law, like the Lord, helps him who helps himself."
By 1881 enough American jurisdictions had adopted the
rule for Judge Grason to say, in Burger v. Greif,8 that
"after a careful examination of the authorities [the doc-
trine] may be considered as settled."9 Nowhere in the
opinion is there the slightest reference to Doub v. Barnes.
84 Gill I (Md. 1846).
'He based his argument here on the assumption that the levying credi-
tors had not acquiesced in the trustee's actions, since, If they had, equity
would bar their levy without reference to the doctrine.
S4 Gill 1, 21-22 (Md. 1846).6 Ibid., 11, 15.
7 Ibid., 13.
855 Md. 518 (1881).
9 Ibid., 526.
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But it really doesn't matter, because the facts fell not
under the rule but one of its exceptions. 0 leased three
lots to A. who mortgaged them to 0, then assigned his
interest to B, expressly subject to the mortgage. B then
mortgaged lot number 1 to C, again expressly subject to
O's mortgage. Very shortly thereafter, C started fore-
closure proceedings and B assigned his interest in all lots
to D for a consideration of "$60 and 'payment of the mort-
gage hereinafter referred to' ",o being O's mortgage. At
the foreclosure sale of his mortgage, C purchased the equity
for less than one half the unencumbered leasehold value
of the property. D then assigned his interest in lot number
2 to F. When foreclosure was begun under O's mortgage,
C filed a bill which alleged the value of his lot to be greater
than the outstanding debt, and that he had offered to pay
that entire debt, and prayed for a sale of D's remaining lot
number 3, then F's lot number 2 before his own, plus an
injunction against the sale of his lot before the others.
The lower court granted his prayers, but, on appeal, was
reversed. The difficulty, as the Court of Appeals saw it,
was the fact that all purchasers took by instruments which
expressly subjected their interests to the 0 mortgage.
"Where all the purchasers from a mortgagor have
bought subject to a mortgage, the obligation of each
to pay the mortgage forming part of the consideration
of his purchase, they all stand upon equal footing, and
the mortgagee has the right to sell any part he may
think proper for the payment of his debt, and the only
remedy the party whose land is sold has, is a pro-
ceeding to compel contribution from the other pur-
chasers.""
So, with different facts and a different prejudice as to
the application of the doctrine, the Court reached the same
result as that of Doub v. Barnes. The opinion is liberally
sprinkled with unclear if not irrelevant dicta.'2 Even Mr.
-0 Ibid., 527.
"Ibid., 528-9.
32 For instance, Judge Grason quoted with favor a Pennsylvania case to
the effect that the rule " 'cannot extend to a case where the first sale was
made subject to a mortgage'." (528). This is not only of doubtful value
to the decision but plainly nonsense. If 0 owns four lots subject to a mort-
gage, sells number 1 expressly subject thereto, later sells the others for fee
simple prices and makes no mention of the mortgage, the sale of number 1
subject to such mortgage is no reason not to apply the rule between 2, 3,
and 4 if, at foreclosure, number 1 doesn't bring enough, assuming the doc-
trine is looked on with favor.
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Tiffany wasn't very certain how to handle the case in his
footnotes.13
The most recent case, Hopper v. Smyser,4 while ex-
pressing approval of the first part of the doctrine - that
the mortgagor who retains part of the mortgaged premises
after sale of another part for full value without reference
to the encumbrance should suffer that retained part to
be first foreclosed - arrived at a holding identical in effect
to that of each of the cases already discussed: where the
mortgagor conveys one of three lots expressly "subject"
to the mortgage for $5.00 and other considerations with a
special warranty, such lot must pay its pro rata share in
foreclosure; it is not to be held back until the retained lots
are sold.
Are these three cases individually sound? I believe
they are. No one will argue seriously with the merits of
the Hopper holding, for all the Court really decided, for
our purposes, was that the addition of a special warranty
to a deed conveying part of the seller's mortgaged land
does not alter the estate granted - in that case, so much
land in fee simple subject to a mortgage as recited. Or, to
put it another way, the warranty doesn't negative the
recitation that, in effect, the buyer will have to be respon-
sible for his pro rata share if the mortgage is foreclosed.
Nor is the Burger" case open to criticism on its holding,
for, where a mortgagor conveys parts of his mortgaged
premises reciting the existence of the encumbrance, the
only fair inference is that he intended every equity owner
- himself and his grantees - to pay his own share should
foreclosure come about. Only if he accepted a purchase
price that a reasonable man would pay only for unencum-
bered land could it be inferred that he expected to bear
the full burden.16
'5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939), §1446, notes 93, 96, and 8.
In the former the case fitted, but in the latter two it gave fits.
" 90 Md. 363, 45 A. 206 (1900).
1555 Md. 518 (1881).
One question that didn't receive its due explanation was the effect of
the assignment made prior to the first foreclosure in which the considera-
tion was recited as "$60 and 'the payment of the mortgage hereinafter
referred to'." Ibid, 527. Actually, it was immaterial to the disposition of
the case since B was assigning his entire interest. But, had he retained
one of the lots, one would expect that such a burden on the lots disposed of
would have the effect of charging them with the entire mortgage so that
they would be sold completely out in foreclosure before any of the lots
retained could be reached. That is, such a recitation shows the intent of
the seller to exempt the land retained from the mortgage as long as the
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It is with Doub v. Barnes7 that the argument starts.
Though its facts don't fit the classical simplicity of the
hypothetical case I used to illustrate the meaning of the
doctrine, they are close enough: should purchasers who
paid full value (but got no warranty - these were trustee's
deeds) for parcels encumbered by judgment liens have
their land sold in inverse order of purchase to satisfy those
liens? The Court said "no", but had to reject the doctrine
to do so. In the later cases the Court could pay lip service
to the doctrine and still refuse to apply it. With this case
such was not possible. I think tle result was proper, though
for reasons other than the mere fact that such is "the es-
tablished law in the English Courts"."8
Going back to our original hypothetical case in which
O owned Blackacre and Whiteacre, each valued at $10,000
and both mortgaged as security for a $10,000 loan: why
should B, the purchaser of the equity in Blackacre, get
preferential treatment in foreclosure (1) over 0, and (2)
over C? As mentioned before, as between 0 and B, that
Whiteacre, left to 0, should be sold first is the only fair
solution, since 0, by asking a pro rata apportionment, is
trying to have his cake and eat it too. Though a special
warranty deed was used in the illustration, the fact of
warranty or not in such a situation is immaterial, for it
is O's act of accepting a price which one would expect to
be paid only for unencumbered land which obliges him,
in equity, to protect Blackacre to the full extent of White-
acre's value. But, when the argument is between B and
C, both purchasers of 0 for full value, the equity favoring
B is not so clear.
Let us once again pay attention to what the encyclo-
pedist has to say:
"The reasons advanced for the rule are that if the
parcel had not been alienated, but had been retained
by the grantor, it would have been primarily liable
for the payment of the paramount encumbrance, in
exoneration of a parcel previously conveyed; that a
land sold was worth more than the outstanding debt - a complete reverse
on the doctrine.
This raises an additional question; when the first out-conveyance is
made, should it be treated as primarily liable or only proportionately liable
if it has a "subject" clause? That is, should a "subject" clause be treated
the same as an assumption agreement in the consideration? The author
says "no", simply because if primary liability is intended, assumption will
be put in the conveyance. This was evidently, though not certainly, Judge
Grason's attitude in the Burger case.
174 Gill 1 (Md. 1846).
Ibid., 21.
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purchaser of such remaining parcel takes it subject to
the same equities as existed against it in the hands
of the common grantor in whose seat he sits; and that
no act of the common grantor, subsequent to the con-
veyance or encumbrance of the parcel first aliened or
encumbered, can take away from the purchaser or
encumbrancer of that parcel the equity which is so
attached against the remaining land at the time he
purchased his parcel or took his encumbrance thereon,
or can convey to the purchaser or encumbrancer of the
parcel next aliened or encumbered greater rights in
that parcel than the common grantor himself had. It
is reasoned that the purchaser or encumbrancer of the
parcel aliened or encumbered subsequent to alienation
or encumbrance of other parcels of the land can, hav-
ing the means of determining the fact of prior aliena-
tions or encumbrances, protect his land from primary
liability falling upon it by reason of the applicability
of the doctrine in question; and the rule of equity which
fixes responsibility on the party who is in the better
position to foresee and prevent the situation from aris-
ing is here given effect."'19
This, I respectfully submit, is pure rubbish. It is said
that the later purchaser sits in the seat of the common
grantor, taking his land subject to the equities which ex-
isted against that grantor in favor of the earlier purchasers.
This is absurd because the equities of B are purely per-
sonal against 0 - they don't run with the land at all. Even
if 0 has warranted Blackacre, the title warranty is per-
sonal only. By selling to C, 0 is not creating higher equities
in C - he is merely dropping out of the picture to leave
two equally innocent, equally stupid people to dispute who
is to pay off the mortgage. As to this "who has more equity"
side of the problem I think the presence or absence of
warranties in the deeds must control. If B gets a warranty
of title and C takes a quit-claim deed, then and only then
should the doctrine work, for 0 has in fact put C in his
seat, leaving him what there may be lying around after
the conveyance to B. In that situation only are the equity
arguments of the doctrine sound. If the situation is re-
versed - B taking the quit-claim and C the warranty, B
opened himself up for later shenanigans by 0 and should
not be heard to complain when 0 has seen fit to favor C.
When each takes a quit-claim deed or each takes a war-
35 Am. JUR. 404, Marshaling Assets and Securities, §35.
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ranty deed, one might say each is in pari delicto, or at least
equally negligent.20
This brings us to the second reason for the doctrine: that
the later purchaser is in a better position to discover the
gum in the title chain. Again let the encyclopedist act as
the apologist for the doctrinaires:
"... a successor in title to the land retained after
the first conveyance, in searching back his title, neces-
sarily finds that it formed a part of a larger tract all
covered by a single mortgage, of which a portion had
been conveyed away, and he cannot in safety ignore
the deed of that portion, but must examine it, if for
no other reason than to see that the original owner,
after that conveyance was made, still retained title to
all the land which he purported thereafter to transfer;
and that being pointed so directly to that deed and
charged with knowledge that under the law its terms
might materially affect his obligation under the mort-
gage, reasonable care requires that he examine not
only the description in it but the terms it contains
1)21
It is true enough that a search of the records, properly
made by the later purchaser, will show the state of title.
It is also true that the earlier purchaser, by a proper title
search, would discover an outstanding mortgage against
the property no mention of which is made in his deed. Are
we to consider it reasonable for him to ignore that mort-
gage lien and rest fat, dumb, and happy on the assumption
that by his paying full value for the parcel it will go un-
touched in some later foreclosure proceedings? That is the
way the doctrine would have it, but the whole notion flies
in the teeth of good conveyancing practice. Let's face it -
these situations never arise if a conveyancing lawyer has
handled the transfer. Indeed, any attorney who hasn't for-
gotten all of his law school conveyancing course would
demand, as a condition of full value purchase, a release
from the mortgagee. It is useless to talk of what the later
purchaser would discover by a proper search and ignore
what the earlier purchaser should have discovered. The
fact is, neither has made a search, and by such lack of dili-
gence, each missed discovering the title defect which, had
it been found prior to settlement, would have been re-
20 The courts have not had a happy time with this warranty problem. See
131 A. L. R. 4, 102 et seq.
2135 AM. JuR. 422, Marshaling Assets and Securities, §55.
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moved. The fault lies as much with the one as with the
other. That being the case, each should pay pro rata when
foreclosure comes.
The point to be driven home is this: if either purchaser
had gotten a decent title search he would have discovered
that he wasn't getting what he was paying for - unen-
cumbered land. Since neither discovered the ruse being
practiced by the common grantor, it is hypocritical to talk
of the "better opportunity" of the later purchaser to dis-
cover the difficulty and protect himself. It is also nonsense
to talk of the grantor's "intent" to charge his remaining
land with the primary mortgage liability after the first
sale. Such "intent" is pure fiction and, though some legal
fictions may be useful and even equitable, this one has no
place in the law.
This matter of relative vigilance leads to the final point.
Suppose the mortgagor has sold one parcel for full value
and even given a warranty. He wants to sell the rest, but
his second purchaser, discovering the prior deed and na-
turally suspicious, demands a release for his parcel. Can
the first purchaser, discovering this business, protect him-
self? Yes - by giving notice to the mortgagee before the
release is executed.22 If he does not, then the mortgagee
can seek satisfaction entirely from the parcel first con-
veyed. This is a sensible rule of diligence. But, if such
alertness is required of the first purchaser to protect his
"equity" from the very normal and natural possibility of a
subsequent release of the remaining land, is it not just as
reasonable to demand alertness in the first instance - alert-
ness in discovering the mortgage and getting a release for
himself before settlement? Surely the latter is an easier
way to protect one's land than the former. And it is cer-
tainly unfair to hold, as some cases have, that the entry
of the first purchaser into possession is itself notice to the
mortgagee of this so-called equity, thus making any future
release by the mortgagee one at his future peril. Such a
rule permits the first purchaser to profit from the laziness
or cupidity which originally occasioned his searchless
purchase.
Harking back to Judge Magruder's latin in Doub v.
Barnes23 - vigilantibus non dormientibus leges subserviunt
- I should think that one who can be vigilantibus about
letting the mortgagee know where he stands could equally
well have been vigilantibus about searching the records in
Ibid., §58.
4 Gill 1, 13 (Md. 1846).
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the first place, an effort that would have saved everybody
a great deal of perspiration. Our recording system is there
to be "used, not abused," a simple little doggerel which
the doctrine of sale in the inverse order of alienation com-
pletely ignores. The author is not trying to vindicate the
later purchaser - he is just as dormientibus as his prede-
cessor - but is trying to relieve him of the entire primary
liability to pay off the encumbrance which the doctrine
would impose upon him for being not one bit sleepier nor
more stupid than his predecessor. It seems to me that
where two people are equally negligent in using our record-
ing system, their equities are equal and they should
shoulder the burden of this irresponsibility in some pro-
portional fashion. This is a matter of equity, not of law,
and it seems strange to hear the cry of fairness raised in
support of a doctrine which smacks strongly of the old
flippancy "let the devil take the hindmost."
